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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAV-191,9-50
not reached. Instead, the court found the act to be an attempt
to amend the Liquor Control Act in a maner violative of Sec-
tion 13 of Article IV of the Illinois Constitution or, if not, was
incomplete in its provisions, hence ineffective to stand as an in-
dependent statute.
VIII. TORTS
Traditional tort questions concerning the liability of own-
ers of animals for injury done by their beasts still receive atten-
tion in states where open range conditions exist, but rarely does
an Illinois court have trouble with the matter. One recent Ap-
pellate Court decision would indicate that general principles of
negligence have taken charge of situations where, at common law,
absolute liability might have been imposed as well as in cases
where statutes have tended to place strict liability on motorists
who tangle with animals found running at large. In Guay v. Neel,'
it was decided that a motorist was not entitled to recover for
damage sustained in a collision with an escaped horse, provided
the owner of the animal had used due care in restraining it.2
With equal detachment, the court said the owner would be unable
to recover on a counterclaim for damage to his livestock if the
motorist was free from negligence.
Recognizing a trend away from the doctrine which permits
of an immunity in favor of a municipal corporation for the torts
of its agents while acting in the course of a governmental ac-
tivity, the Appellate Court for the First District added its bit to
the mounting collection of objections to that theory by its holding
in Both v. Collis. The court there construed the 1945 amend-
ment to the Cities and Villages Act,4 one which placed a munici-
pality in the position of indemnitor as to judgments recovered
against policemen, to presuppose liability on the part of the po-
liceman. As a consequence, it denied the defendant officer's con-
tention that immunity attached to his actions. The section of the
1340 Il1. App. 111, 91 N. E. (2d) 151 (1950).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 8, § 1.
3339 Il1. App. 437, 90 N. E. (2d) 285 (1950).
4 I1. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 1-15.
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statute in question had previously implied that personal immunity
existed because of the presence of the words "the municipality
only . shall be liable." There is reason to wonder why a
statute with so obvious a purpose cannot be drawn by which to
leave no doubt about the position of the city and its employees on
the question of liability or immunity. Section 1-13 of the same
chapter expressly immunizes firemen, putting liability on the mu-
nicipality for the negligent operation of motor vehicles used by
the fire department. The considerations seem to be identical in
the two cases, hence one can only speculate over the necessity of
two or three amendments, each accompanied by confusion caused
by a switching of theories, to accomplish so simple an objective as
the stating of the liability or the immunity attaching to the city
and its employees.
A unique challenge to the inference of negligence arising in
res ipsa loquitur cases was presented in Siniarski v. Hudson.5 In
that case, three workmen of the defendant had been killed while
replacing a boiler, so that the defendant was as much in the dark
as to the cause of the explosion as was the plaintiff. The defend-
ant urged that, as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur had been
founded on the premise that those in control when the mishap
occurred would best be able to explain how it occurred, the death
of the three workmen prevented defendant from having knowl-
edge of the circumstances superior to that of the plaintiff, as
is posited by the rule. The attempted qualification was rejected
and the court ruled that the question of negligence was properly
submitted to the jury, irrespective of the fact that the defendant's
difficulty in seeking to overcome the inference of negligence would
be as acute as would be that of the plaintiff in establishing it.
Disparagement, or slander of title, received attention in the
case of Pendleton v. Time, Incorporated,6 when the painter of the
first portrait of Truman, as president, brought an action for al-
leged injury sustained when the defendant published another
portrait with a caption identifying it as the first such product.
5 338 IlM. App. 137, 87 N. E. (2d) 137 (1949).
6 339 Il1. App. 188, 89 N. E. (2d) 435 (1950). Niemeyer, J., dissented.
SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-1949-50
The plaintiff alleged loss of advantage accruing to him by virtue
of his priority in execution; loss of sale value of the portrait; and
loss of commissions to do further portrait work. A majority of
the court felt that the plaintiff had complained of sufficient dam-
age to state a cause of action. The dissenting opinion, however,
more nearly sets forth the requirements, as they are generally
stated, for an action of this type. It points out that the great
weight of authority requires one to allege the special damage with
particular care, so that the complaint of pecuniary injury must
result from the failure of a specific sale or the loss of definite
customers.
7
The more conventional type of libel came up for consideration
on three occasions when plaintiffs complained that they had been
described as communists, fascists, pro-Nazis, and the like.8 In
none of the cases could the court find that the plaintiff had ac-
tually been named as a communist. In one of them,9 however, the
Appellate Court for the First District, by way of dicta, recog-
nized that characterizing a person as a communist and as an un-
American disciple of fascism would be libellous per se, citing
federal decisions in support of that position. 10 A careless de-
fendant may yet make some Illinois law on the point.
7 See comments on the decision in the instant case appearing in 30 Boston U. L.
Rev. 278, 35 Corn. L. Q. 899, 12 Det. L. J. 154, and 38 Ill. B. J. 588.
8 Dilling v. Illinois Pub. & Ptg. Co., 340 Ill. App. 303, 91 N. E. (2d) 635 (1950);
Parmalee v. Hearst Pub. Co., 341 Ill. App. 339, 93 N. E. (2d) 512 (1950) ; McWil-
liams v. Sentinel Pub. Co., 339 Ill. App. 83, 89 N. E. (2d) 266 (1949).
9 Dilling v. Illinois Pub. & Ptg. Co., 340 Ill. App. 303, 91 N. E. (2d) 635 (1950).
10 Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F. (2d) 619 (1947); Holden v. American News Co., 52
F. Supp. 24 (1943).
